World Wide Alliance of Top Level Domain-names

Communiqué from Bucharest meeting

Questions from the ccSO [in formation] to the ERC on ICANN Reform

Bucharest, 24 - 25 June 2002

1. At page 13, the purpose of NomCom appointments is to balance the representative selection to ensure participants who place the public interest ahead of any particular special interest. What is the nature of the .imbalance. in the ccSO, which is made up of ccTLD managers from all over the world, that NomCom appointees will rectify?

2. If the NomCom is in response to the need for .at large. representation, was it ever recommended that the At Large make appointments throughout the ICANN structure?

3. Are there occasional lapses in language in the Report where g-names are not clearly distinguished from c-names?:

   At pages 5, paras. 5&6 refer to market mechanisms to promote "a competitive environment" and "competition in the registration of domain names". At page 19 a per domain name levy is calculated of $0.25.

4. Why should the ccSO not separately incorporate, nor function additionally as a trade association?

5. Its hard to sustain an argument that failure to reach a cctld contract, a root server agreement, or an RIR contract is due to burdensome process.

6. At page 10, reference is made to ICP-1, which has not been adopted by the ICANN policy development process. (It appears that its name was approved in the February Board meeting, but not the content). Is there any intention to adopt this as an ICANN policy?

7. At page 10 of the Blueprint, commitment to the the ICANN policy development (and membership of the ccSO) is evidenced by "other means". What is intended by this wording.?

8. What protection is available to protect our Local Internet Communities, and the stability of the internet, from Board-developed policies, such as the systematic refusal to update the IANA database, without a contract?

9. Does our ability to control the development of policy extend to control of the staff, when such as the above occurs?

10. When you look at the proposed structure of ICANN with the ASO, ccSO and the GNSO and set this in relation to the structure of the NomCom, the ccSo has only one representative there, while the GNSO for example has 7 representatives. Why is this so?

11. Does the global policy development in the proposed ICANN structure cover the IANA services including the issue of redelegation?